In this paper, we develop a political economy model with a voting equilibrium to analyze the impact of remittances in the government's redistributive policy. Remittances affect the distribution of income and the households' demand for public redistribution. In this paper we consider the impact of remittances on two types of redistributive programs: a universal and a targeted transfer program. For an economy with targeted public transfers, we identify conditions in which an increase in remittances crowds out the social transfers of the government. If the redistributive program is universal then an increase in remittances actually increases the size of the government's transfers.
INTRODUCTION
The transfers of money by foreign workers to their home country, or remittances, are playing an increasingly important role in the economies of many countries. According to a report from the World Bank, the remittances' flow to developing countries are estimated to reach 283 billions in 2008 and in several countries, such as Honduras, Jordan, Lebanon, and México, the share of remittances to GDP reaches significant levels.
There is a growing literature that seeks to explain the dynamic growth of remittances and its economic effects. An issue that has received recent attention is the impact of remittances on the distribution of income of the donor's home country, see for instance Acosta et al. (2007) , Adams and Page (2005) , Cox and Jimenez (1990) , and Stark et al. (1988 Stark et al. ( , 1986 . In particular, Stark et al. (1986) identify conditions in which the recipients of remittances are predominantly high (low) income families. Consequently, the flow of 1 Moreover, from the perspective of fiscal policy design, it is important to study the interaction between private and public transfers because this issue is: first, closely related with the analysis of the proper versus the actual role of the government in the economy. Second, it is central in explaining the effectiveness of the government's effort to redistribute income since the government's tax and transfer policy might reduce the private transfers among families in the market economy which in turn might frustrate the government's effort to redistribute income.
2 For these reasons, in this paper we are interested in asking the following question: Do remittances crowd out the government's redistributive policy?
Moreover, although there is substantial literature that examines how the government's transfers crowd out private transfers, see Becker (1984) , Roberts (1984) , and Cox and Jimenez (1990) , to the best of our knowledge, there is no study that systematically examines how private transfers affect the redistributive policy of the government. Therefore, there are interesting questions to be analyzed such as: If the distribution of private transfers from households working abroad change, such that the average size of remittances increases, then the government increases or reduces its role in redistributing income?, Is the government's response to remittances the same if public redistribution is universal or targeted to the poor?
To answer these questions, we develop a political economy model with a probabilistic voting equilibrium to analyze the impact of remittances on public redistribution. We choose a voting model to characterize the formation of the government because this model leads to empirically verifiable tests between the actual votes of citizens in the election and the policy decisions made by elected governments.
In our economy, two parties compete for votes by selecting a tax on full income and a per capita transfer. Voters observe the parties' redistributive platforms and vote sincerely for the party with the policy that is closest to the voter's own views on public transfers. After the election takes place, the candidate winning the election forms the government and implements his platform on public redistribution. In this context, we are also interested in asking: what is the role of electoral competition in explaining the 1 To see this, it is sufficient to recognize that policy makers might have incentives to use the tax system to redistribute in favor of low income families. For instance, the normative theory, see Tresch (2002) , suggests that a benevolent planner might act on behalf of the society's tastes for pro poor redistribution. The positive theory, see Mueller (2003) , argues that policy makers might redistribute in favor of the poor to capture some political gains.
2 Families might redistribute income if a high income family provides private transfers to a low income household (for instance the private transfer of a father to a son or vice versa). The literature, see Becker (1984) and Roberts (1984) , suggests that the public transfers of the government crowds out the private transfers among families.
response of public transfers to remittances? In this setting, candidates select the tax rate on full income by considering: first, the electoral costs associated with the distributions of tax burdens and deadweight costs from taxation which in this economy are constituted by distortions of taxes on the supply of labor of households living in the country and crowding out effects of taxes on remittances sent by residents working abroad; second, the tax rate on full income raises public revenue which leads to higher public transfers that provide electoral support to parties.
Remittances affect the parties' fiscal policy by modifying the distribution of the voters' preferences for redistributive policy. For instance, remittances received by households at the highest end of the distribution of income increase their full income and reduce their demand for public redistribution (since models of self interested agents suggest that redistribution is an inferior good) but also increase the demand of redistribution of households with lower than average incomes. 3 Hence, remittances affect several aspects that are relevant to the parties' political calculus of fiscal policy design; First, the private transfers sent by migrant workers change the distribution of full income of voters across the economy and therefore the households' tax burdens. Second, remittances also change the distribution of the marginal utility of income across the electorate which in turn modifies the electoral gains from redistributing income. Third, an increase in remittances induces a positive income effect on the government's budget constraint which tends to increase the extent of public redistribution.
However, it is not obvious what is the net effect of remittances on the size of public transfers. The main contribution of this paper is the characterization of sufficient conditions in which an increase in the average size of remittances crowds out the government's transfers in a targeted program but increases the size of public transfers in a universal program.
In our economy, we can trace the response of the government's transfers to an increase in remittances in two components: The first component is the effect of remittances on the tax rate on full income that finances the government's redistributive program. The second component is a positive income effect of remittances on the budget constraint of the government. For an economy with targeted redistribution in which the electoral competition induces parties to produce moderate redistributive policies, the elasticity of remittances with respect taxes is inelastic, and the response of taxes from the government to changes in remittances is elastic then an increase in remittances induces both parties to reduce the tax rate on full income and the per capita social transfer.
In the universal program of redistribution, an increase in remittances does not affect the tax rate of equilibrium but affects positively the budget constraint of the government by allowing parties to collect more tax revenue that is translated into higher public transfers. Consequently, in a universal redistributive program, an increase in the average size of remittances increases the size of the government's transfers.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The households' choice set is considered in section 2. The electoral equilibrium is characterized in section 3. Section 4 includes the analysis of the impact of remittances on the redistributive policy of the government. Section 5 includes a discussion over possible extensions of our topic and section 6 concludes.
THE HOUSEHOLDS' CHOICE SET
Consider an economy in which households residing in the country have preferences given by 2 / ) , (
, where c is consumption, γ is a positive constant, and
is the supply of labor. 4 In this economy the distribution of preferences and abilities are identified by the density ) (n h where n is the voter's earning ability (or labor wage) and γ is the marginal utility of consumption. Then
. The opportunity choice set for resident consumers proposed by some party k. The latter is positive in a universal redistributive program for all voters and can be positive or zero in a targeted program depending on whether the consumer beneficiates or not from public transfers. The wage income is l n z = and remittances are R.
We rationalize why households working abroad send remittances by assuming that foreign workers are altruistic and care about the well being of their families living in their home countries. Our choice of rationalizing remittances throughout altruism is based on two aspects: First, the phenomenon of altruism has received significant theoretical attention, therefore altruism can be a relevant benchmark to compare with other approaches that seek to explain private, inter-vivos, transfers. However, in section 5 we discuss other approaches that seek to explain why individuals provide private transfers. Second, altruism has some empirical support see Juarez (2009), Agrmal and Horowitz (2002) , and Banerjee (1984) which makes this approach a relevant starting point for our analysis. a a a n n n ∈ . For simplicity, and without loss of generality of our analysis, we ignore international taxes and transfers of migrant households.
In this paper we also assume households have no mobility. This assumption is not because we consider the bi-causality role of migration and public policy is not important but because of mathematical simplicity of the model. In future research we will consider the impact of politically driven redistribution and migration. For the time being, we take as given both the distribution of migrant families working abroad and the distribution of resident households in the donor's home country.
ELECTORAL COMPETITION UNDER PROBABILISTIC VOTING AND THE REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT
In this economy, households have preferences over public redistribution which, among other things, depend on the individuals' earning abilities. The heterogeneity of earning abilities in this economy leads to conflicts among voters over the extent of public redistribution. Therefore, the social choice problem for this economy is to find the society's ideal size of public redistribution. The political institution that solves the society's social choice problem is an election in which candidates of parties propose a redistributive policy, and voters observe the parties' platforms and vote to elect a public official.
We follow the literature on linear income taxes, see Romer (1975) and Roberts (1977) , by considering a democracy with a single unit of government and a majoritarian evidence that is not consistent with the altruism motivation of private transfers, for a brief review of this evidence see Cox (1987) and more recently Juarez (2009) . 6 This characterization means that households living abroad seek to maximize their well being by deciding their supply of labor and the size of remittances given their preferences and budget constraint, and the preferences and budget constraint of their families in their home countries. At this point we use a general characterization of the indirect utility function of the family of the migrant living in the home country because this function will change depending whether the redistributive program is targeted or universal for households with different wage earning abilities.
electoral system in which the winner takes all. 7 Parties seek to maximize their probability of winning the election, ) , ( . Voters observe the parties' platforms and vote for the party with the tax system that is closest to the voters' own preferences over public redistribution. We assume that only residents of the home country have voting rights while those individuals who have migrated abroad (the remittances' donors) have no voting rights.
8
Voters are rational and recognize the fiscal exchange, that is, taxes raise public revenue to finance the public transfers that the government provides to eligible households. The preferences of a voter over public redistribution depend on the voter's relative position in the distribution of income. Self interested voters with higher (lower) because they pay higher (lower) than average taxes. To capture the voter's fiscal exchange from the government's redistributive policy, we characterize the ideal fiscal policy of a voter type n by ) , ,
is the indirect utility subject to the public budget constraint in which the per capita public transfer T is financed by taxation.
Candidates design fiscal policy by considering the probability that a voter type n votes for party k. This probability is given by ))
is the net utility for voter type n if party k is elected, and
is the utility of the voter when party k selects policies
as the distribution of the marginal probability function over ) (n k ψ . The probability that an individual type n votes for party k is
where
The proportion of expected votes for party k in the election is given by
(2)
The probability that party k wins the election is denoted by the cumulative distribution over the plurality of parties then
is the marginal probability over the plurality of party k denoted by
The probability that party k wins the election is characterized by
The problem of tax policy design for candidates
that maximizes their probability of winning the election subject to the public budget constraint k T (defined below). Formally, the problem is
The politico-economic equilibrium of this economy involves the strategic interaction of parties, resident households voting in the election, and households working abroad. In figure 1 we depict a three stage dynamic game in which the payoffs of all players are common knowledge. Parties move in the first stage by announcing their tax platforms to maximize their probability of winning the election.
In the second stage of the game, voters (residents of the country) observe the parties' policies and decide their supply of labor, consumption and their choice of the vote that maximizes their well being. The economic choices of resident households recognize their preferences and their budget constraint while their voting behavior is determined by their own preferences over the government's redistributive policy and the policy platforms of parties. Voters vote for the party's platform that is closest to their own 9 The assumption of the concavity of k π is commonly used in the probabilistic theory of voting, see Coughlin 1992 , and in its applications to fiscal policy design, see Hettich and Winer (1999) and Mueller (2003) .
preferences on the government's redistributive policy.
Figure 1. Redistribution for an Economy with Remittances
Moreover, in the second stage of the game, the remittances' donors also observe the parties' tax and transfer policies and maximize their well being by deciding their supply of labor, consumption, and the size of remittances given their preferences and budget constraint, and the preferences and budget constraint of their families in their home countries.
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In the third stage, the party winning the election implements its tax and transfer platform. In our economy parties commit to their tax platforms, therefore the party that wins the election implements its campaign's tax platform. Therefore, the dynamic inconsistency problem between the parties' campaign promises and the policies implemented by parties while they hold office do not arise in our economy since our candidates are Downsian and they select policies to win and hold public office (they do so because, in the Downs' model, candidates seek the prestige of holding public office).
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Our model is different to the class of models in which parties have preferences over policy (these preferences could be characterized by the tastes for policy of a representative member-activist inside the party) and are dynamically inconsistent see Wittman (1973) , Alesina (1987) and Roemer (1997 Roemer ( , 2001 . 12 In the latter case, parties 10 The dotted line in Figure 1 means that the moves of recipients and donors of remittances are simultaneous.
11 To see this, note that proposing (in the first stage) and implementing (in the third stage) a tax and transfer policy that maximizes the party's probability of winning the election is sequentially rational. That is, for Downsian parties, there are no profitable deviations from the strategy prescribed above. 12 Wittman (1973) is the first to point out that parties might have preferences for public policy and might 15 not select policies to win the election (as it is argued by Downs, 1957) but seek to win the election to design policies. Alesina (1987) emphasizes the dynamic inconsistency problem and provides an application of partisan political competition with dynamic inconsistent parties to explain monetary policy, and Roemer (1997, 2001 ) provides applications to the analysis of taxation. 13 We could expect that parties with preferences over public policy campaign the ideal policy of the median voter in Downsian models of perfect information and the ideal policy of the average voter in Downsian models of imperfect information since these strategies maximize their probability of winning the election and are sequentially rational. For details of the differences of these strategies see Mueller (2003) . 14 Voters vote with probability 2 / 1 for any party if 0
Our definition of the politico-economic equilibrium recognizes that a rational household working abroad decides the size of remittances taking into account the impact that taxes and public transfers have on the economic well being of their families living in their home country. Proposition 1 characterizes conditions in which the best response, ) , ( 
Proof
By definition, the families working abroad behave as follows:
The first order conditions for households working abroad are: 
is a strict quasiconcave preference relation which implies that a H μ is a negative definite matrix
It follows that the best response of remittances to taxation is given by
. The size of remittances falls or remains unchanged with increases in the optimal tax rate on full income.■ Condition (7) shows that two factors explain the size of remittances: first, the 17 To obtain the first order conditions use The possibility that the government's actions might crowd out monetary transfers among families (the result in proposition 1) has been first pointed out by Becker (1984) and Bernheim et al. (1985) . 18 Here we just identify conditions that imply this result. Full crowding out of the government's taxes on remittances occurs when the condition 0 / < dR d a μ is satisfied for a given tax k t , while some partial crowding out occurs when
. In our economy, the optimal redistributive policy of the government at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium takes into account the crowding out possibilities discussed above. For mathematical tractability, we consider only the case in which the marginal effect of taxes on private transfers, 0 / ) , (
, and the elasticity of remittances and taxes given by
TARGETED AND UNIVERSAL PUBLIC REDISTRIBUTION AND REMITTANCES
In this section we analyze the impact of remittances on the size of transfers of the government. We consider two types of redistributive programs that have received attention in the literature: on the normative theory of public economics, the analysis over targeted versus universal redistribution has been centered around the tradeoff between equity and efficiency see Saez (2006) and Thresch (2002) . Targeted redistributive programs are considered to produce lower deadweight costs from taxation relative those of universal programs but also tend to penalize more heavily the effort of low income families who are in the vicinity of the poverty line by creating high differentials in their taxes and public transfers.
The theory of political economy has also been interested in the comparative analysis of targeted versus universal public programs, see Myerson (1993) and Persson and Tabellini (2005) . In particular, some branch of this theory is interested in studying how political institutions (i.e., the structure of electoral systems) create incentives to policy makers to design public programs with broad benefits versus public programs that seek 18 There is also empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that the government's fiscal policies crowd out private transfer. For a survey on this issue see Cox and Jimenez (1990). to benefit minorities. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001a) are interested in explaining why governments implement inefficient targeted redistribution. They argue that if the political process can not commit to future policy (rents), inefficient redistribution is a tool to sustain the political power of a special interest group.
In a targeted program of transfers to the poor, only those individuals with earning abilities below a predetermined earning ability threshold receive transfers from the government. In our economy, ñ is the cutoff point that divides the participation earning ability threshold, therefore all individuals with n n≤ are poor and eligible for public transfers while individuals with earning abilities higher than ñ are not eligible for social transfers. We also analyze a universal public program in which all individuals in the economy receive transfers from the government.
The rest of the analysis of this section is structured as follows: in proposition 2 we identify the optimal labor supply of poor and non poor households under the different redistributive programs analyzed in this paper. These results are then used to characterize proposition 3 which contains the government's response to remittances when public transfers are targeted to the poor, while proposition 4 considers the reaction of the government to remittances when the redistributive program is universal.
Proposition 2 For an economy in which a tax k t is applied to full income of all resident households and social transfers can be universal or targeted to the poor, the supply of labor of poor and non poor households are characterized by
] , [ ) 1 ( ) , ( max 0 * n n n t n n t k k ∈ ∀ − = l .(10)
Proof
We omit the formal characterization of the households' labor supply. The result, however, is trivial we just solve the first order conditions of the household's problem to obtain ) , ( 
The effect of remittances on the parties' tax policy is given by In proposition 3 we show that parties set the tax rate on full income at the point in which the electoral costs and gains from a marginal change in * t are equalized (see condition A.1 in the appendix). The parties' political calculus is the following: On the one hand, an increase in * t creates disincentive effects that lead to a net fall in remittances, labor income, and the consumption opportunities of all households. In this evidence see Cox and Jimenez (1990) . 20 On what follows, and to save space, we just simply refer to an increase in remittances when there is a change in the distribution of remittances such that the new distribution has a higher mean of remittances. 21 Assuming a change in the average size of remittances
is a shortcut to consider the case in which the earning ability of some donors increase and leads to higher remittances sent by the donors to resident households with some earning ability n .
case, an increase in * t leads to a loss on the voters' welfare and to an increase in the marginal electoral costs from taxation for parties. On the other hand, higher * t leads to higher tax revenue and public transfers. This, in turn, increases the parties' electoral support.
In a targeted redistributive program, if the elasticity of foreign transfers to taxation, 23 As a result, a change in the average size of remittances induces parties to reduce both the tax rate on full income and the per capita transfer. 24 However, recall that the second effect of remittances over * T is a positive income effect which tends to increase * T . In proposition 3, the sufficient condition in (3.1) implies that the first negative effect of remittances on Of particular interest is the fact that the elasticity R t− ξ depends on how the political process aggregates the preferences for redistribution of voters. To recognize this, we need to acknowledge that parties choose a redistributive policy by weighing the preferences from those voters who support public redistribution against the interests of voters who oppose redistribution. The impact of this political calculus on the government's response to remittances can be easily traced if we define 
Remittances and Universal Public Transfers
In this section we consider an economy with a universal redistributive program. The main difference of this section with our previous analysis relies in the eligibility requirement of resident households for receiving public transfers. Under a universal redistributive program, resident households pay a tax on full income In a universal redistributive program, an increase in the average size of remittances increases the parties' electoral gains and costs in the same proportion. For this reason, an increase of the average remittances leaves unchanged the tax rate on full income. However, as a result of higher remittances, there is a positive income effect on the budget constraint of the government which increases the size of the public transfer.
In propositions 3 and 4 we evaluate how different distributions of remittances with different means affect the government's redistributive policy. 25 Of related interest is to study changes in the private transfers received by households at the upper (lower) end of the distribution of income. In Kochi and Ponce-Rodríguez (forthcoming) we provide such analysis for a government ruled by a benevolent social planner. In general, this analysis suggests that an increase in remittances for households at the lower end of the distribution of income reduces the inequality of income, but the response of the government's public transfers to an increase in remittances is ambiguous. 26 Nevertheless, in our analysis we characterize a set of equilibriums in which higher remittances to households at the lower end of the distribution of income are more likely to crowd out public transfers under the universal redistributive program in relation to the targeted program. In particular, if remittances are received by households with an earning ability n that is below the threshold earning ability ñ that allows the family to beneficiate in the targeted redistributive program, taxes are low before the increase in remittances, the remittance-tax elasticity is inelastic, R t− ξ is negative and elastic, and the household's social marginal utility is decreasing with income, then an increase in the remittances received by households with n n< leads to a fall in the inequality in the distribution of income and induces the government to reduce public transfers in the targeted and the universal redistributive.
However, if ) ( n E n n < < where ) (n E is the average earning ability, then an increase in the remittances received by households with n leads to a fall in the inequality in the distribution of income and induces the government to reduce public transfers in the universal redistributive program but it increases public transfers in the targeted program. This result is intuitive and explained as follows: in a targeted redistributive program, ñ divides the distribution of beneficiaries (those who receive transfers) from the distribution of net contributors to the financing of the program (those who pay taxes but do not receive transfers). In this case, Pareto efficient redistribution is indeed reducing the inequality of the distribution of income between beneficiaries and net contributors to the financing of the government's program. Thus, higher remittances for those with ) ( : n E n n n < < reduce the inequality of the overall distribution of income of the economy but spread the socially relevant distribution of income that the government seeks to equalize. As a result, the government increases 25 Another justification for the analysis of propositions 3 and 4 is that this approach is useful for empirical analysis with macro data. 26 This outcome is explained by tradeoffs that are similar to those identified in this paper: higher remittances received by the poor affect the socially optimal tax structure of the government with taxes going up or down depending on certain parametric values of the donor's reaction to taxes and on the distribution of the social marginal utility of income. Moreover, these private transfers also induce a positive shock on the budget constraint of the government which tends to increase Pareto efficient transfers. In general, however, higher remittances to the poor lead to an ambiguous effect on the government's transfers.
transfers in a targeted program. Moreover, in the universal redistributive program, the distinction between the socially relevant and actual distribution of income disappears. Hence, higher remittances for households with n reduce the inequality of the distribution of income and public transfers fall. Finally if n n E n) ( < < then an increase in the remittances received by households with n leads to an increase in both the socially relevant and the actual inequality in the distribution of income and induces the government to increase public transfers in the targeted and the universal redistributive program.
DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss some possible extensions to our analysis: first, the role of democracy versus autocracy in determining public redistribution. Second, the motivation for private transfers, whether remittances are explained by altruism or by other incentives, and the response of public transfers to changes in remittances.
With respect the role of democracy versus autocracy in determining public redistribution, the model of Downs (1957) of electoral competition predicts that parties propose a moderate redistributive policy that seeks to appeal to a majority of voters. In contrast, Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2001b) argue that autocratic systems might exclude a substantial part of individuals from the decision making process and, therefore, the extent of redistribution in non democratic economies could be smaller (or zero) relative the size of redistributive spending in democratic regimes.
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The analysis of Acemoglu and Robinson identifies a class of equilibria in which no redistribution takes place in non democratic regimes. An application of this equilibrium to the issue analyzed in this paper could suggest that an increase of remittances to residents of non democratic economies might lead to an increase in tax revenues, zero redistribution, and maybe an increase in military spending. The last conjecture follows from the analysis of Olson (1993) who argues that non democratic regimes could use military spending to create barriers to political participation for those individuals who may oppose the government. Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i-Martin (2004) show evidence that non democratic regimes have, indeed, higher shares of military spending to GDP relative democracies and also tend to create barriers for the development of political opposition.
The literature has also acknowledged that autocratic governments might seek some form of broad political support to maintain power. Hettich and Winer (1999) have provided a model in which policy makers design tax policy to maximize political 27 This hypothesis is consistent with empirical evidence by Husted and Kenny (1997) that suggests that the U.S. voting acts of the 1960s and 1970s increased the voting franchise and turnout of the poor and led to an increase in welfare spending. Aidt et al. (2006) also find that the removal of voting restrictions is positively associated with government spending in 12 European countries. support to the regime. Although Hettich and Winer (1999) are mainly concerned with tax policy in democratic regimes, the model is general enough to be applied to the analysis of fiscal policy of autocratic governments. In their model, the function of political support is a weighted sum of the household's utilities and there is a class of equilibria in which autocratic regimes might redistribute in favor of the poor. In this case, the tradeoffs for policy makers of tax and transfer policy promoted by changes in the size of remittances identified in this paper might still be valid.
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With respect the issue of how we rationalize remittances, the literature explains inter-vivos private transfers through altruism, see Becker (1984) , in which donors provide private transfers because their utility depends on the welfare of their relatives. Bernheim et al. (1985) and Cox (1987) , argue that donors could behave according to pure self interest and remittances arise because donors expect to receive benefits from their parents (such as services, care, attention and inheritances). Lucas and Stark (1985) suggest that remittances can also be explained by tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest. In this case, remittances are part of a mutual risk spreading or investment contract between the migrant and her family. Self interest induces all parties to recognize that there are economic gains to be shared if some members become migrants while altruism might also play a role in enforcing the contract.
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In this paper we have limited our attention to altruism as the rationale for remittances. However, rational governments will recognize that, contingent to the motivation of international private transfers, the response of voters and donors of remittances might vary to the government's tax and transfer policies. 30 This might change the distribution of tax burdens and deadweight costs from taxation as well as the distribution of gains from public transfers which, ultimately, will have an impact over the welfare and political calculus of public redistribution in a way that is not obvious. Future research would be desirable to address these and other issues relevant for policy making when remittances are explained by self interest or tempered altruism. 28 This is true for the particular case in which the utilities of households are equally weighted in the function of political support to be maximized by the government. 29 For example, a household might seek to spread risks by allocating some members to international migration. Initially, the family might support the migrant while remittances could be claims that flow to the family at times of hardship. In this setting, altruism might induce all parties to enforce the expected duties of each member of the contract. 30 For example consider the case in which remittances are explained by economic exchange between the donor and the recipient. In this case a net increase of public transfers to some household might lead to the recipient to reduce her supply of services to the remittances' donor. Hence, the donor might be forced to increase her payments (remittances) to the recipient in order to keep her services. In this case, higher public redistribution might lead to higher remittances. The opposite might hold for those voters with a net fall of public transfers in which case remittances might fall.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we develop a political economy model with a voting equilibrium to study whether an increase in remittances crowds out the redistributive policy of the government of the donor's home country. We also examine if the impact of remittances over public transfers differs under two different redistributive policies: a universal and a targeted transfer program.
In our voting equilibrium, the political process leads to a formation of a government that designs a redistributive policy to please the average voter of the economy (the government produces middle of the road policies). The preferences of voters over public redistribution depend on the voter's relative position in the distribution of income. An increase in the flow of remittances changes the distribution of the voters' preferences for public redistribution since remittances change the full income of resident households and the parties' political gains and costs from public redistribution.
For the economy assumed in this paper, the response of the government's public transfer to remittances depends on the effect of remittances on the tax rate of equilibrium that funds the government's transfers, and on a positive income effect of remittances on the budget constraint of the government which tends to increase public transfers. In general, the net effect of a change in the distribution of remittances on taxes is ambiguous.
In this paper we show that if the government produces moderate policies, the elasticity of remittances with respect taxes is negative and inelastic, and the response of taxes from the government to changes in the distribution of income due to remittances is negative elastic or unitary, then an increase in the average size of remittances reduces both the tax rate on full income and the size of the government's transfers when the redistributive program is targeted to the poor.
In the universal program of redistribution, an increase in remittances does not affect the tax rate of equilibrium but affects positively the budget constraint of the government by allowing parties to collect more tax revenue that is translated into higher public transfers. As a result, in a universal redistributive program, an increase in the average size of remittances actually increases the size of the government's social transfers in a universal redistributive program. 
Appendix
The distribution of the tax burden implied by the structure of the linear income tax means 31, 32 
is the household's marginal utility of income. Use (A.2) to rewrite condition (A.1) as follows
Since parties share a common system of beliefs over voting behavior and the strategy policy space and candidates are not otherwise differentiated, then parties converge in their fiscal platforms toward k t t k ∀ = * * (for a formal proof of this result see Coughlin 1992) . It follows,
. Use condition (10) of proposition 2 and our 31 To obtain the results in (A.2) consider the following: 
Use the first order conditions of the consumer's choice in the condition above to conclude
32 From now on we will write ) , ( 
as the average size of remittances received by resident households. Hence condition (A.4) is now The government's budget constraint for an economy with a linear income tax system in which taxes on full income are applied to all voters is given by remittances is an increase in the government's social transfers. ■
